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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCEPTANCE TESTING 
By Char les  H. M. Laubach 
Lyndon B. Johnson  Space Center  
SUMMARY 
The Apollo environmental acceptance test program is described in te rms  of the 
test  background at the outset of the Apollo Program, the experience gained from vibra- 
tion acceptance testing, the introduction of thermal/thermal-vacuum testing, the 
environmental acceptance test  requirements, the implementation of environmental 
acceptance testing in the Apollo Program, and the results of this test program. Appen- 
dixes provide summaries of industrial surveys conducted on acceptance vibration test- 
ing and thermal/thermal-vacuum testing. 
The environmental acceptance test  program for  the Apollo spacecraft resulted in 
the verification that the hardware, as manufactured, was adequate for  flight before 
spacecraft installation. 
closing workmanship and manufacturing flaws. Regardless of how well the inspection 
procedures and functional tes ts  were developed, environmental exposure of the hard- 
ware was found to be the best means of detecting many types of faults. 
This test  program proved to be an effective method for  dis- 
INTRODUCTION 
The environmental acceptance test  program consisted of three types of testing: 
vibration, thermal cycling in ambient conditions, and thermal cycling in a vacuum. 
The basic philosophy of the acceptance testing program was to provide the assurance 
that a given piece of hardware would perform reliably. A comprehensive test program 
includes qualification and acceptance tests. The qualification tests are designed to 
evaluate the hardware and to demonstrate that the hardware, a s  designed and manu- 
factured, will  perform a s  specified. The adequacy of the manufactured flight and test 
hardware can be verified through the acceptance test program. These tes ts  ensure 
that the hardware is equal in  quality to the qualification hardware. 
Generally, qualification tests were conducted on one or two production articles, 
whereas environmental acceptance testing was conducted on all flight and ground test 
art icles after the component types were selected for the environmental acceptance 
tests.  
defects and manufacturing flaws, which could not be readily detected by normal inspec- 
tion techniques, were not present in flight and test  hardware. The environmental 
acceptance tests provided further verification that the quality of the hardware was 
acceptable fo r  flight before installation in the spacecraft. 
The environmental acceptance tes t s  provided verification that workmanship 
As an aid to the reader, where necessary the original units of measure have been 
converted to the equivalent value in the Systgme International d'Unit6s (SI). The SI 
units are written first, and the original units are written parenthetically thereafter. 
~ 
ENVl RONMENTAL ACCEPTANCE TEST BACKGROUND 
At the outset of the Apollo Program, a one-time qualification of a component o r  
system design was performed. The qualification provided a reasonable margin of 
safety fo r  the expected environments that the hardware would experience during stor- 
age, transportation, handling, and ground tes t s  over two mission duty cycles. 
I 
I 
At that time, it was proposed that a rigorous qualification program was not ade- 
quate in itself to provide flight quality hardware, and that each flight item should be 
subjected to some environmental testing as a par t  of acceptance. Although most func- 
tional components and systems underwent acceptance testing, the detailed test p,lans 
were left to the individual designers and systems engineers. Most testing was limited 
to functional bench tests at room temperature and pressure.  A few components 
received a functional test  after a brief exposure to vibration. This vibration was 
applied to the equipment in the most sensitive axis and a t  various vibration levels up to 
the expected flight-vibration environment. A few electronic component vendors, who 
were experienced in critical military programs and in other NASA programs, per- 
formed temperature limit t es t s  at their own discretion during buildup o r  during final 
acceptance testing. 
I 
The f i r s t  contractual attempt to impose specific environmental acceptance test  
requirements was  in November 1965. These requirements were to have been imple- 
mented on the Block I command and service module (CSM) but were canceled in 
May 1966 because the Block I vehicles were in an advanced stage of assembly, and 
removal from the spacecraft of components requiring acceptance testing would have 
been necessary. The requirement was placed on the Block I1 spacecraft in Feb- 
ruary 1967.- 
tion of 60 percent of the qualification power spectral  density test  level, but not less 
than 0.005 g /Hz for a minimum of 1 minute. The industry was surveyed regarding the 
philosophy and implementation of vibration requirements fo r  acceptance testing so that 
inordinate requirements would not be imposed on the contractor. The resul ts  of the 
survey are  discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The November 1965 acceptance test requirement was a random vibration excita- 
2 
2 
U. S. Air Force Programs 
The U.  S. A i r  Force required acceptance vibration testing on a majority of i t s  
hardware. Both random and sinusoidal vibrations were required a t  test  levels repre- 
senting the flight levels and f rom 3 to 6 decibels below the qualification level. In addi- 
tion to other U.S. Air Force requirements, the f i r s t  stage of the Titan 111 launch 
vehicle was static fired. This firing essentially subjected the hardware to a vibration 
test  a t  the maximum environment. 
NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
The NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight Center had no formal requirement 
for acceptance vibration testing on Saturn launch vehicle hardware; however, some 
hardware did receive acceptance vibration testing. Each completed stage of the vehicle 
was static fired, which subjected the components to some vibration before flight. 
Gemini Program 
Gemini components as well as the complete spacecraft were subjected to accept- 
ance vibration tests before flight. Components were tested throughout the program, 
whereas vehicle testing was discontinued after the third spacecraft. The vibration 
levels were 75 percent of the qualification level. 
I ndustrial Practices 
An industrial survey conducted by the Aerospace Industries Association of 
1 America (AIAA) indicated that 80 percent of the companies surveyed used acceptance 
vibration tests.  The average level used during testing was 60 percent of the qualifica- 
tion level. A total of 91 percent of the responding companies recommended acceptance 
vibration tests.  
Whether uniform criteria had been applied to acceptance vibration testing of 
flight hardware by the contractors was not known. The extent of the nonuniformity of 
the CSM acceptance vibration testing was determined by evaluating acceptance test  
plans, procedures, and control drawings. Of the 415 hardware items, 303 did not 
receive an acceptance vibration test. The hardware i tems that were vibration sensitive 
and those that experienced failures during qualification vibration testing were delineated 
on a master l ist .  This list contained many items that had not been subjected to vibra- 
tion acceptance testing, further emphasizing the need for an adequate vibration accept- 
ance test  program. 
'Aerospace Industries Association of America: Industry Practices.  Published , 
i n  an AIAA letter signed by P. E.  Everett, executive secretary,  Nov. 10, 1966. 
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In early 1967, after the Apollo fire, spacecraft acceptance test  practices were 
reviewed extensively. A questionnaire survey of Apollo subcontractor and vendor 
acceptance testing was conducted. The questionnaires included 79 questions concern- 
ing the subcontractor and vendor acceptance test  plans and objectives. To secure a 
representative sampling of the varied technologies, 21 CSM and 12 lunar module (LM) 
components were selected f o r  the survey. This survey revealed the inadequacy of 
environmental acceptance tests and, in many cases,  their nonexistence. The vibration 
acceptance test levels were often based on the expected flight levels. Unfortunately, 
many of the expected vibration levels were so low that the early environmental accept- 
ance tests did not reveal e r r o r s  i n  workmanship and manufacturing processes. How- 
ever,  many of these faults were discovered later in the spacecraft checkout cycle; this 
situation delayed the program and resulted in  the use  of excessive manpower. Accept- 
ance test  environments must be severe enough to detect faults, yet not so  severe as to 
weaken or fatigue the hardware to the point of reducing its useful life. In recognition of 
the generally too low or  nonexistent spacecraft environmental acceptance test levels, an 
effort was undertaken to establish new levels and requirements for the Apollo Program. 
V I  BRATI ON ACCEPTANCE TEST1 NG 
The study of early Apollo acceptance and qualification vibration failures revealed 
that workmanship and manufacturing faults not detected by the 3.5g to 4g root mean 
square (rms) levels during acceptance tes t s  were later revealed by the 7.8g r m s  
qualification levels. Early in the Gemini Program, acceptance levels slightly higher 
than 4g rms were imposed before the qualification testing of a component. This rela- 
tively low acceptance level (early Gemini acceptance program) permitted one of every 
two quality faults to enter the qualification program, whereas the levels used in the 
early Apollo Program permitted two of every three such faults to enter the qualifica- 
tion program. At the beginning of the Gemini flight program, the vibration acceptance 
level was raised to 6.2g r m s ,  and 45 additional quality faults were screened from the 
previously acceptance-tested flight hardware; some of these could have resulted in 
cri t ical  failures during the mission. From the data, i t  was apparent that there was  a 
threshold level below which many quality faults would not be detected. Also, the data 
indicated that the nominal threshold o r  minimum acceptance level should be established 
a t  approximately 6. Og r m s .  
Environmental exposure was used more extensively for acceptance testing in the 
successful unmanned spacecraft programs. Also, the levels used were much higher 
than those used in  the Apollo Program. For  instance, thermal vacuum and vibration 
were used for  acceptance testing of the Mariner IV spacecraft. A 9g r m s  vibration 
level was used for  acceptance testing, and a 16g r m s  level was  used for qualification 
testing. 
Based on the data obtained from the assessment of the Gemini experience and the 
other spacecraft programs, a more rigorous acceptance vibration test  program was 
instituted on Apollo spacecraft components. A level of 6. l g  rrns and the spectrum 
shown in figure 1 were adopted as the Apollo spacecraft minimum acceptance vibration 
level. This shape spectrum was selected because the qualification tests for  many CSM 
components were conducted to it and at 1.6 t imes this level, which was considered 
satisfactory. 
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(a) Occurrence for each thermal test  type. 
Figure 2. - Acceptance test failures 
during thermal testing of LM 
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ENVl RONMENTAL ACCEPTANCE TEST REQUIREMENTS 
Acceptance testing included exposure to  one o r  more environments, as required 
to detect possible faults. The following faults were expected to  be exposed by accept- 
ance vibration testing. 
1. Loose electrical connections, nuts, bolts, etc. 
2. Relay contact chatter 
6 
3. Physical contaminants 
4. Cold solder joints and solder voids 
5. Incomplete weld joints 
6. Close tolerance mechanisms 
7. Incomplete crimp connections 
8. Wiring defects (i. e., strands cut away with insulation removal) 
9. Shrinking of potting resulting in loose assembly within housing 
10. Too soft potting permitting excessive movement of components and wiring 
Faults expected to be exposed by acceptance thermal/thermal-vacuum testing are listed 
in table I. The number, duration, and severity of tes ts  were not to cause overstressing 
o r  degradation of the capability of the hardware to perform its intended function. Where 
possible, all normal, alternate, redundant, and emergency operational modes were 
tested. 
The acceptance tests were to be performed with s t r ic t  adherence to the environ- 
ments and test  procedures. The hardware was calibrated and alined before acceptance 
tests were conducted. Adjustment or tuning of the hardware was not permitted during 
testing unless the adjustment was  normal to  the inservice operation. 
For environmental acceptance testing, a failure was defined as the incapability 
of the component to perform its required function under the conditions and duration 
specified in the acceptance test  specifications. After any repairs, modifications, o r  
replacements during or  after completion of acceptance tests, retesting was required to 
ensure the acceptability of the hardware. Retest requirements were to be proposed and 
submitted to NASA f o r  approval. 
A r e t e s t  t ime limit was established for each type of component. A total acceptance 
test time, including the anticipated retest time, was established for each component 
and included in the qualification test  requirements. 
Hardware Assembly Level 
A hardware assembly level was selected such that the dynamic transfer function 
of the s t ructure  caused a minimum magnification o r  damping of the input to the internal 
parts. Additional considerations were the assembly level of replaceable spares  (black 
box level) and the capability of the assembly to be operated and monitored during 
testing. 
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TABLE I. - FAULTS EXPECTED TO BE EXPOSED BY ACCEPTANCE 
THERMAL/THERMAL-VAC UUM TESTING 
Characteristic 
Potting voids 
Short run wires 
Welded and soldered connections 
Corona leakage 
Outgassing contaminants 
Bimetallic effects of leaf spring 
Solder splash on printed circuits 
Insulation penetration 
Thermal grease application 
Close tolerance mechanisms 
Hermetically sealed components, 
environmental seals 
Thermal interface integrity 
Thermal control paint 
Thermal 
a Environment 
Thermal 
cycling 
Vacuum Therm a1 
vacuum 
a The environment most likely to expose a type of fault is indicated by parentheses. 
Hardware Select ion 
Each component or  subsystem for  which a certification tes t  requirement existed 
was a candidate fo r  environmental acceptance testing. The following cr i te r ia  were 
used to select the particular items to be subjected to environmental acceptance testing. 
1. Items that could not be effectively inspected during manufacture or  items the 
assembly of which involved processes that made quality control difficult (all electrical/ 
electronic and electromechanical components) 
8 
2. I tems that had delicate mechanisms requiring precise  adjustments 
.: .01 
2 
+ e -  (20° F) below the acceptance test  tempera- 
-;.@% tu re  range. (The acceptance qualification 
3. Items that had marginal 'environmental sensitivity 
- 
7.89 rrns overall level - 
1 1 I 1 l l l l  1 I I I I 1 1 1 1  I 
4. Items that were known to have high failure rates early in life 
After a component type was selected f o r  environmental acceptance testing, 100 percent 
of those flight and ground test items were tested. 
Acceptance Vibrat ion Test Levels and Dura t ions  
The vibration test  levels and spectra were to the expected mission level o r  the 
acceptance vibration test  minimum (fig. l), whichever was greater. The test  duration 
was a minimum of 30 sec/axis; 1 min/axis w a s  considered to be the optimum duration. 
However, a functional and/or continuity check on all circuits had to be performed dur- 
ing the test, but this requirement seldom resulted in a test  time of more than 1 min/axis. 
Acceptance TherrnallTher mal -Vacuum Test 
Levels and Durat ions 
The temperatures usedfor the dynamic thermal/thermal-vacuum tests were the ex- 
pected mission level change from minimum to maximum o r  a minimum temperature sweep 
of 56K( 100' F) (fig. 5), whichever was greater. The vacuum level was  1.333 mN/m 
(1 X 
with a functional or continuity check.being performed on all circuits during the test. 
2 
torr)  or less. The test  duration was a minimum of 1.5 temperature cycles 
Qual i f icat ion S i  rnulat ion 
9 
M o n i t o r i n g  
Functional tests o r  continuity tests, or both, were conducted on all components 
before, during, and after the environmental acceptance tests. If complete functional 
verification was impossible during the acceptance tests, because of limited test  time, then 
critical crew safety and mission success functions were given priority. All other circuits 
were continually monitored during the test  for continuity andunwanted short  circuits. 
Retests 
After all failures were repaired, the unit was subjected to a retest. The contrac- 
tor was not authorized to grant waivers for acceptance tests. Also, the hardware was 
not to be accepted without the required acceptance retest  unless a waiver had been 
granted by MSC. In no case was the accumulative acceptance test  time, plus the antic- 
ipated mission time, permitted to exceed the qualification test  time for that environment. 
ENVl RONMENTAL ACCEPTANCE TEST1 NG IMPLEMENTATION 
IN  THE APOLLO PROGRAM 
Several L M  and Block I1 CSM spacecraft had completed assembly and were in 
checkout when the decision was made to implement the more rigorous environmental 
acceptance test program. Thus, only selected components were removed from these 
spacecraft for acceptance vibration testing. The effectivity for  component selection 
was different on the early manned spacecraft because the spacecraft had already been 
assembled when the test  program was initiated. 
Vibra t ion  Test C r i t e r i a  
The criteria used for component acceptance vibration tes t  selection were as 
follows. 
F i r s t  manned CSM and LM. - For  the first manned CSM and LM, only crew safety 
equipment was tested. A crew safety (Criticality I) component is one i n  which a 
failure by itself o r  in combination with an undetected failure could create an associated 
single failure point that could impair crew safety. Crew safety equipment was defined 
as that which, if disabled, could result in loss  of abort dapability, loss  of caution and 
warning, loss of voice communication, inadvertent engine firing, loss  of attitude control, 
or loss  of an habitable environment. Provision of redundancy did not automatically 
remove equipment from the crew safety category because redundant equipment of like 
configuration could contain the same workmanship fault. 
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Second manned CSM and LM. - For  the second manned CSM and LM, crew safety 
and mission success  (Criticality I and I1 (primary objective)) equipment was tested. 
A mission success  component is one in which a failure by itself could cause the loss  
of a mission o r  a primary objective. 
Third manned CSM and LM and succeeding spacecraft. - For the third manned 
CSM and LM and succeeding spacecraft, all selected components (Criticality I, 11, 
and I11 (secondary objective)) were tested. The list of components selected f rom all 
categories for acceptance vibration testing is contained i n  appendix C. 
The acceptance vibration test cri teria (fig. 1) in a number of cases  exceeded the 
original qualification levels. Therefore, a significant quantity of LM and CSM hardware 
required requalification to the 7.8g rms  spectrum shown in figure 6. Requalification 
was required on 19 of the 65 CSM components and 26 of the 83 LM components that were 
subject to acceptance vibration requirements. These components a re  identified in 
appendix C. In numerous cases, the acceptance test level was  modified slightly 
to avoid the necessity of requalifica- 
tion and yet satisfy the intent of the 
new acceptance tests. An example of a 
shown i n  figure 7. Totals of 39 of 
83 LM components and 10 of 65 CSM 
- 7.19 rms - - - 5.929 rms component tested to modified levels is 
n components were tested to modified 
spectra. 
.- 
0 
\ Thermal lTher mal -Vacu u m e 
Test C rite r i a 'i d .OlOk 
-\ The acceptance thermal/thermal- vacuum tests  were implemented as an in-line function; however, all compo- 
spacecraft, were to be made with units 
that had received acceptance thermal/ 
thermal-vacuum tests. Flight usage of vibration spectra. 
a component that had not received accept- 
ance thermal/thermal-vacuum testing 
required that three like components had received acceptance thermal/thermal-vacuum 
testing before the mission. Using the acceptance test  data from like components, the 
lot sampling technique was  used in determining the flight acceptability of hardware that 
had not been tested. 
10 100 loo0 10 wo 
Frequency, Hz 
,0010 
nent replacements, including the ear l ie r  
Figure 7.- Examples of modified 
The component selection cri teria used for thermal/thermal-vacuum acceptance 
testing were based on the criticality of the hardware. The l ist  of the selected compo- 
nents is contained in appendix C. 
In some cases, the revised Apollo acceptance thermal/thermal-vacuum test  require- 
ments exceeded the qualification levels. To avoid the necessity of requalification, the ' 
temperature sweep (fig. 5) w a s  reduced slightly f rom the optimum 56 K (100' F), and 
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the differential temperature between acceptance and qualification extremes was reduced 
f rom 11 to  5.5 K (20" to 10" F) and, in one or two cases, to 2.8 K (5" F). 
Acceptance Number of Different 
test item components component 
tested types 
ENVl RONMENTAL ACCEPTANCE TEST RESULTS 
Failures 
Total Percent 
A summary of the environmental acceptance test  history is presented in tables I1 
to N and figures 8 to 11. These data were compiled from the test history of the envi- 
ronmental acceptance test program imposed after mid- 1967. 
CSM 5 613 65 
LM 6 348 83 
Total 11 961 148 
Some 11 961 component tests were performed on 148 types of components dur- 
ing the acceptance vibration test program with a failure rate of 6.85 percent. Some 
4286 component tests were performed on 126 types of components during the accept- 
ance thermal/thermal-vacuum test  program with a failure rate of 15.98 percent. The 
smaller  number of thermal/thermal- vacuum tests  was a result of the later effectivity 
of this test program. An overall accounting of the environmental acceptance testing 
performed on a selected number of component types is presented in table 11. 
22 1 3.94 
598 9.42 
819 6. 85 
TABLE 11. - APOLLO SPACECRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL 
CSM 1 179 55 
LM 3 107 71  
Total 4 286 126 
ACCEPTANCE TEST HI STORY^ 
158 13.40 
527 16.96 
685 15.98 
%he data f rom which this table was developed were received from North 
American Rockwell Corporation and Grumman Corporation in  monthly status 
reports . 
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TABLE IV. - SAMPLES OF DEFECTS DISCLOSED BY ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACCEPTANCE TESTING 
(a) Command and service module 
Component 
E le ct ronic control assembly 
Flight director attitude indicator 
Radiofrequency (rf) coaxial switch 
Antenna assembly 
Reaction control system 
control box 
Mission events sequence 
controller 
Service module jettison controller 
Power factor correction 
Rotation controller 
e 
Thrust vector position 
servomechanism 
Electronic control assembly 
Rotation controller 
Signal- conditioning equipment 
Failure 
Defective module 
Contamination 
Teflon chip on rf contact 
Coaxial line connectors 
backed off (epoxy not 
properly cured) 
W i r e  improperly inserted 
in terminal board 
Insulating material between 
relay contacts 
Premature time delay 
actuation 
Break o r  nick in fuse wire 
Damaged terminal and 
broken wire 
Damaged wire insulation 
Broken resis tor  
Pitch gear binding 
Dam aged trans is tor  
Test phase 
During vibration 
During vibration 
During vibration 
During vibration 
During vibration 
During thermal 
During thermal 
During thermal 
During thermal 
After thermal 
During thermal 
During thermal 
During thermal 
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TABLE IV. - Continued 
(b) Lunar module 
Component 
Descent engine control assembly 
Attitude translation control 
ass em bl y 
Attitude translation control 
ass em bl y 
Abort control assembly 
Abort electronics assembly 
Abort sensing assembly 
Rendezvous radar electronics 
assembly 
Reaction control system 
solenoid valve 
Reaction control system 
solenoid valve 
Reaction control system 
solenoid valve 
Stabilization and control 
assembly 
Caution and warning electronics 
assembly 
Auxiliary relay switch assembly 
S-band steerable antenna 
Failure 
Dewetted solder joint 
Defective solder joint on 
diode 
No solder at joint with 
cordwood 
Pitch drive shaft not 
inserted far enough into 
clamp 
Intermittently open 
capacitor 
Collector leads broken on 
transistor 
Relay contamination 
Potting not complete; 
glass fracture 
Contamination on magnet 
faces 
Contamination on Teflon 
seat 
Relay contam inat ion 
Relay distortion prevented 
current flow 
Open relay coil 
Improper mating of male 
and female pins 
___-. - 
Test phase 
During vibration 
During vibration 
After vibration 
After vibration 
During vibration 
After vibration 
After vibration 
Af ter  vibration 
After vibration 
After vibration 
After vibration 
During vibration 
After vibration 
During vibration 
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TABLE IV. - Concluded 
(b) Concluded 
Component 
S-band steerable antenna 
Very- high-f requency transceiver 
Rate gyro assembly 
Abort control ass em bl y 
Abort control assembly 
Reaction control system engine 
chamber pressure 
Lunar surface sensing probe 
Carbon dioxide sensor  
Stabilization and control assembly 
Pressure  transduce r 
S- band power amplifier 
Emergency detection relay box 
Auxiliary switch relay box 
Inve r te r 
Inverter 
Floodlight 
Failure 
Misalinement of windup 
mechanism 
Intermittent relay contacts 
Faulty stator 
Improper calibration 
Improper centering of 
sector gear 
Quality yield problem 
Reed switch failed 
Defective capacitor 
Relay contamination 
Poor lead routing 
Improper res is tor  
selector 
Contam ination 
Defective splice 
Integrated circuit leakage 
Broken wire (excess 
crimping) 
Broken wire in potting 
Test phase 
After vibration 
After vibration 
During thermal 
vacuum 
During thermal 
vacuum 
During thermal 
vacuum 
During thermal 
During thermal 
vacuum 
During thermal 
During thermal 
After thermal 
During thermal 
vacuum 
During thermal 
vacuum 
During thermal 
During thermal 
vacuum 
During thermal 
vacuum 
During thermal 
A comparison of the acceptance 
thermal/thermal-vacuum and vibration 
testing is presented i n  figure 8. Work- 
manship defects accounted for 7.65 per- 
cent of the thermal/thermal-vacuum 
test  failures as compared with the 3.81 
percent for  the acceptance vibration 
tests. Although the purpose of environ- 
mental acceptance tes ts  was  to detect 
workmanship and manufacturing defects, 
a significant number of design e r r o r s  
were also detected. Design defects 
accounted for 3.68 percent of the 
ther mal/ther mal-vacuum test  failures 
as compared with 1.46 percent of the 
vibration test failures. The number of 
workmanship and design failures dis- 
closed by acceptance vibration and 
3 12 ri 
,-8 
e 
'Z 6 
4 
2 
0 
- 
Y 
Test errors Total failures Workmanship Design 
Figure 8. - Comparison of vibration and 
thermal failures during acceptance tests. 
thermal/thermal-vacuum tests is presented by subsystem in  table 111. In table IVY 
samples of the defects disclosed by the environmental acceptance testing are presented 
with a notation showing the type of test that revealed the failure. 
The failure trends throughout the environmental acceptance test  program a r e  pre- 
sented in figures 9 to 11. The figures show the accumulative failure trends for work- 
manship flaws, design defects, test e r ro r s ,  and failures still in  evaluation. In fig- 
u r e  9(a), during the period from July to September 1969, the marked increase in  design 
failures was  a result of the reevaluation and reclassification of a number of circuit 
breaker failures f rom workmanship to design. The increase i n  workmanship failures 
shown i n  figure 9(b) during the period from September 1968 to June 1969 was attrib- 
utable, in part ,  to the increasing number of component types being subjected to accept- 
ance vibration testing. The increase i n  thermal/thermal-vacuum failures shown in 
figures 10 and 11 resulted f rom additional types of components being integrated into 
the program. Finally, the failures caused by test e r r o r s  remained at  a level much 
higher than expected. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Before mid- 1967, very little emphasis was placed on environmental acceptance 
testing as a method of detecting defects in Apollo spacecraft hardware. Although 
rigorous environmental acceptance tests were implemented late, the tests were both 
comprehensive and effective. To provide an effective screen for workmanship and 
manufacturing defects, environmental acceptance tes ts  must have minimum levels to 
which the hardware will be subjected. These minimum levels must be established 
independently of flight levels and conditions. 
17 
Parameters 
I 0ct.-Dec. I Jan.-Mar./Aor.-June 
No of units tested 246 493 641 
Workmanship failures la1 16 19 - - 
Design failures (a)  5 10 - ~- ~- 
la)  19 19 
11 
Total failures 37 52 59 
~ 
Tesf errors 
I n  evaluation l a )  12 
~~ 
1947 ~ 
46 54 
15 
25 1 30 34 ~ 4 7  43 49 53 53 
~ 1 ~ 1 ~ .- ~ 
6 2 2 10 a 9 10 3 2 
96 112 132 156 195 197 219 219 220 
~. .. ~ ~~~~ -~~ ~~ ~ 
~ 
aNo breakdown of data during this time frame. 
bCircuit breaker failures reevaluated and changed from workmanship to design. 
(a) CSM. 
(b) LM. 
Ian.-Mar. Apr.-June July-Sept. *I 
8 5 1  8 5 1  8 5 1  
585 595 598 
Figure 9 .  - Acceptance vibration test failure trends. 
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1968 
Parameters 
Jan.-Oct. Nov. Dec. 
1969 1970 
Jan.-Mar. Apr.-June July-Sept. 0ct.-Oec. Jan.-Mar. Apr.-June July-Sept. 
(a) CSM. 
No 01 unit< tested 
Workmanship failures 33 
Design failures 21 
Test errors 44 
I n  evaluation 3 4 2 20 19 
Total failures 62 67 76 107 123 
925 1112 1166 1170 1179 
39 50 51 51 51 
M 39 42 42 44 
53 58 62 63 63 
24 3 0 2 0 
146 150 155 158 158 
__ 
(b) LM. 
Figure 10. - Acceptance thermal-vacuum test failure trends. 
Design failures 
Test errors 
Total failures 
19 
19 31 51 65 83 91 94 95 95 95 95 
5 40 57 86 91 107 107 110 113 116 118 
35 136 E 5  295 345 392 477 420 430 436 440 
I I 
1%8 
Jan.-Mar. Apr.-June July -Sept. 0ct.-Dec. 
Parameters 
No. of units tested 11 n 45 63 
Workmanship failures 5 7 16 23 
Design failures 9 11 13 18 
Test errors 3 6 11 14 
I 
1%9 
Figure 11. - Acceptance thermal test failure trends 
for LM panel-level assemblies. 
Based on the Apollo experience, the following recommendations are made for  
future space programs. 
1. Formal environmental acceptance test requirements should be imposed early 
in the program. These requirements should be imposed early in the design stage to 
ensure that proper tests can be conducted and that adequate monitoring of hardware 
response during the test can be accomplished. 
2. Environmental acceptance tests should be conducted at a specific level, equal 
to or greater than an established minimum level, that provides an effective screen for 
workmanship and manufacturing defects. This level should not be established as a 
percentage of the qualification level. Because the purpose of the environmental accept- 
ance test is to screen for  workmanship and manufacturing defects, i t  is logical that all 
components should be capable of withstanding the same environmental level. Therefore, 
the environmental acceptance levels should be considered when specifying qualification 
levels on future programs. 
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3. A study to determine optimum environmental test  levels should be conducted. 
The Apollo Program used a specified minimum level o r  the flight environment level, 
whichever was greater, as the criterion f o r  acceptance testing of hardware. A study 
should be conducted to determine whether a more effective level can be established 
for future programs. 
4. For an effective test  program, more rigorous test discipline should be 
enforced. As an example, of the 11 961 units acceptance vibration tested on the Apollo 
Program, 22.9 percent (188) of the 819 failures resulted from test  e r r o r s .  Of the 
4286 units acceptance thermal/thermal-vacuum tested, 29.1 percent (199) of the 685 
failures resulted from test  e r r o r s .  
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, April 1, 1976 
914-89-00-00-72 
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APPENDIX A 
INDUSTRIAL SURVEY OF ACCEPTANCE V I B R A T I O N  TESTING 
INTRODUCTION 
This appendix contains a summary of the data obtained from the industrial survey 
conducted as a result of the wide variation in the acceptance vibration test requirements 
among the NASA centers and programs. The results of the survey, made in October 
1967, were used to establish confidence in the new acceptance vibration requirements 
for  the Apollo Program. The spacecraft programs and vehicles considered and sur- 
veyed were as follows. 
1. Ranger 
2. Mariner 
3. Biosatellite 
4. Orbiting Geophysical Observatory ( E O )  
5. Vela (nuclear detection satellite) 
6. Pioneer 
7. Surveyor 
8. E a r l y  Bird 
9 .  Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) 
10. Syncom 
11. Burner I1 
12. Lunar Orbiter 
13.  Environmental Science Service Administration (ESSA) 
14. Relay 
15. Space electric rocket test  (SERT) 
16. Tiros 
17. Mercury 
18. Gemini 
22 
19. Nimbus 
20. Agena payloads 
In most of the programs surveyed, the components were subjected to random 
vibration acceptance testing, with the exceptions nf the Bieszte!!ite, K-G, Vc!a, 
Pioneer, and ATS programs. In these programs, sinusoidal vibration acceptance 
testing was used, with peak levels of +5g. Some acceptance vibration tests were con- 
ducted at the spacecraft level. The spacecraft programs surveyed, the test  levels, 
and the qualification factors are presented in table A-I. 
TABLE A-I. - SPACECRAFT PROGRAMS SURVEYED, TEST LEVELS, 
AND QUALIFICATION FACTORS 
Program/vehicle 
Ranger 
Mariner 
Biosatellite 
OGO 
Vela (nuclear detection satellite) 
Pioneer 
Surveyor 
Early Bird 
ATS 
Syncom 
Burner I1 
Lunar Orbiter 
E SSA 
Relay 
SERT 
Tiros 
Mercury 
Gemini 
Nimbus 
Agena payloads 
363 (800) 
261 (575) 
431 (950) 
522 (1150) 
220 (485) 
66 (145) 
1043 (2300) 
41 (90) 
340 (750) 
36 (80) 
113 (250) 
386 (850) 
139 (307) 
81 (178) 
170 (375) 
129 (285) 
1225 (2700) 
3402 (7500) 
590 (1300) 
-- 
Random 
:est level, 
g rms  
7.9 
9 .0  
--  
- -  
-- 
- -  
4. 5 
6. 5 a 
-- 
6. 5 
5.9 
17. 2 
6. 2 
7 . 7  
7. 7 
7.0 
7. 6 
6.2 
9. a 
12.0 
a 
aalif ication factor, 
halification g. r m s  
Acceptance g r m s  
1. 78 
1. 82 
1. 56 
1. 50 
1.39 
1. 55 
1. 50 
1 .41  
1. 41 
1. 41 
3. 16 
1.19 
1. 50 
1.53 
1.53 
3.00 
1. 83 
1.42 
1. 50 
1. 41 
~ 
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%pacecraft level testing used for small satellites. 
COMPONENT TEST1 NG 
number of the spacecraft programs sur- 1.0 
veyed in the 20- to 400-hertz range. 
The Apollo minimum of 3.75g r m s  is 
approximately midway between the high 
of 5.16g rms and the low of 1.82g rms .  N . l o -  
3 A comparison of the overall Apollo min- 
veyed programs is shown in figure A-2, 
with the Apollo minimum level being 
- 
.* s 
“l 
E 
imum g rrns level and those of the sur-  
“l 
- 
e ‘010 
slightly below the average. 
Qualification and acceptance testing was conducted at the component level and at 
the system level in most of the programs. In a number of programs, a selected num- 
be r  of components were tested at the component level, followed by spacecraft level 
testing. In the Early Bird and Syncom programs, vibration acceptance tests were con- 
ducted a t  the spacecraft level only. The qualification and acceptance testing at the 
component level was conducted with the test  art icle mounted to the vibration source in 
a manner simulating its flight installation. 
levels and spectra used were based on the expected mission environments for the par- 
ticular piece of hardware. 
ance testing except when the hardware was required to operate in this type of environ- 
ment during flight. The acceptance vibration g r m s  levels and qualification factors 
given in table A-I indicate the wide variations among programs. 
In general, the acceptance vibration test  
The components were not operated during vibration accept- 
- 
12.09 rms 
Survey -- awrale,-----+C‘-8,M rms 
k\, 4.59 rms 
Survey maximum A 
’ I  ’ ---Zp\ 
0 
6.19 rms 
‘ / I  -Ap$o 
minimum ; 
Vibrat ion Level Comparison 
A comparison of the Apollo minimum levels and spectra and those of the surveyed 
programs is shown in figure A-1. 
had a maximum vibration acceptance level of 12.0g r m s  and a minimum level of 4. 5g 
rms .  The average level of the programs surveyed was 8.8g r m s  as compared to the 
Apollo minimum level of 6. l g  rrns. Programs included in the survey were Ranger, 
Agena, Burner 11, Mariner, Nimbus, Gemini, and Mercury. The Lunar Orbiter was 
omitted because the acceptance test level was too high for  consideration. 
The spacecraft programs included in this comparison 
Fai lure Detection Experience 
A detailed review of the failures 
experienced on the Surveyor program, 
on the Lunar Orbiter program, and on 
several  NASA Goddard Space Flight 10 100 loo0 10 ooo .call0 
Center (GSFC) managed unmanned Frequency, HZ 
spacecraft programs is summarized in 
figure A-3. In each of these programs, 
the hardware was both vibration and 
Figure A-1. - Random vibration 
acceptance test levels. 
2 4  
TABLE A-II. - RANDOM VIBRATION ACCEPTANCE 
TEST REQUIREMENTS 
. . . . . - - 
Agena payloads 
Lunar Orbiter 
Program 
I I 
1 I I 
Ranger 
Agena 
Burner I1 
Mariner 
Nimbus 
Gemini 
Mercury 
Lunar Orbiter 
Apollo minimum 
20 to 400 Hz 
~ 
3 . 9 0  
3.08 
2 .83  
3 . 9 4  
5 .16  
3 . 4 2  
4 .93  
1 . 8 2  
3 . 7 5  
Total 
spectrum 
7 . 9  
1 0 . 3  
5 . 9  
9 . 0  
1 1 . 2  
6. 6 
7 .  6 
17.  2 
6 . 1  
thermal-vacuum acceptance tested. F o r  the GSFC spacecraft programs, only a certain 
number of components were acceptance tested at the component level. During the other 
two programs, all the components were acceptance tested at the component level before 
being subjected to the spacecraft level 
acceptance testing. It should be noted 
that the spacecraft level thermal-vacuum 
testing conducted on these three pro- 
grams disclosed more defects than the 
spacecraft level vibration testing. 
During the Lunar Orbiter environ- 
mental acceptance testing a t  the compo- 
nent level, 54 faults were disclosed in 
256 vibration tests and 27 faults were 
disclosed in 250 thermal-vacuum tests. 
An analysis of these failures revealed 
that, of the 54 vibration failures, 33 
were mechanical; 14, electronic; 6, 
electrical; and 1, structural. Of the 27 
thermal-vacuum failures, 9 were me- 
chanical; 13, electronic; and 5, electrical. 
Surveyor 
Burner II 
ESSA 
Gemini 
.EarlyBird - Syncom 
Tiros 
Mercury 
Relay 
SERT 
Ranger 
Mariner 
Nimhiiq 
iJ- Apollo minimum 
.Tested at systems level only 
I , I  1 I I 
0 5 10 15 20 
Random vibration, g rms 
Figure A- 2. - Acceptance test levels. 
25 
bo 
[ I Vibration 
m T h e r m a l  vacuum 
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CSFC -managed programs Surveyor Lunar Orbiter Lunar Orbiter 
Spacecraft level Spacecraft level Component level Spacecraft level 
7 vibration 7 vibration 256 vibration 7 vibration 
7 thermal vacuum 7 thermal vacuum 250 thermal vacuum 7 thermal vacuum 
Figure A-3. - Failure detection experience. 
The Lunar Orbiter environmental acceptance testing failures can be placed in the 
following four categories. 
Vibration Thermal- vacuum 
Category acceptance acceptance 
Workmanship 8 5 
Manufacturing 5 5 
Par t  failure 5 2 
Design inadequacy 36 15 
SURVEY RESULTS 
The following specific conclusions were drawn from this survey. 
1. The selected Apollo minimum level g r m s  was slightly below average with 
respect to the programs surveyed. 
2. With the exception of two, all the programs reviewed used a higher acceptance 
3. The acceptance vibration test levels f o r  the programs surveyed were normally 
vibration level than the Apollo Program minimums. 
based on expected mission levels. 
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4. Most equipment was operated during acceptance vibration testing only when 
the item was expected to operate in a vibrating environment during flight. 
5. The qualification factors ranged from a low of 1.19 to a high of 3.16, com- 
pared to the Apollo factor of 1.3. 
6. Thermal/thermal-vacuum acceptance testing is also required to provide an 
adequate screen to ensure the quality of the hardware. 
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APPENDIX B 
INDUSTRIAL SURVEY OF ACCEPTANCE THERMALITHERMAL-VACUUM TESTING 
I NTRO DUCT I ON 
An industrial survey was conducted in December 1967 to obtain background and 
supporting data for  evaluating the Apollo thermal/thermal-vacuum test  practices and 
establishing new the rmal/thermal-vacuum requirements fo r  the Apollo spacecraft. 
The following space vehicles and programs were surveyed. 
1. Surveyor 
2. Syncom 
3. Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) 
4. Orbiting Geophysical Observatory (OGO) 
5. Pioneer 
6. Intelsat I11 
7. Nimbus 
8. Biosatellite 
9. Lunar Orbiter 
10. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Agena payload 
11. Burner I1 
12. Orbiting vehicle (OV- 1) 
13. Mariner 
Generally, components were subjected to both qualification and acceptance tests, with 
the exception of the Burner I1 and OV-1 programs. In these two programs, funding was 
limited and maximum use of previously qualified components was made. Consequently, 
qualification and acceptance tes t s  were conducted only on components of new design. In 
the OV-1 program, only the f i r s t  two flight vehicles were acceptance tested. 
Detailed data for  the GSFC payloads flown on the Atlas-Agena, Thor-Agena, and 
Delta- Agena launch vehicles were not obtained. However, most of these components 
were acceptance tested a t  anticipated mission temperature levels, and the qualification 
test levels were 8 K (15" F) higher and lower than the acceptance test  range. 
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COMPONENT TEST1 NG 
Qualification and acceptance testing at  the component level involved controlling 
the environment of the test  article in a test chamber and recording its performance. 
Gemrally, for  test articles cmtaining i&mdi!!y rmmted  COii lpOi ie i i iS ,  the test articie 
was mounted on a test fixture and the temperature extremes were measured at the 
mounting surface. The test art icles were operated in their simulated mission environ- 
ment and the performance recorded. 
The component acceptance and qualification test temperatures for various pro- 
grams are summarized in figure E!-1. The unshaded portion of the bars represents 
the acceptance test temperature limits, and the shaded portion of the bars represents 
the qualification temperature margins. Considerable variation existed in both the 
acceptance and qualification temperatures among programs. However, the average 
acceptance test temperature range for all the programs was from 273 to 314 K (32" to 
105" F). The average qualification test temperature range was from 260 to 326 K 
(8" to 127" F), 12 K (22" F) above and 13 K (24" F) below the acceptance temperature 
levels. Figure B-2 shows the acceptance temperature range of the programs reviewed. 
The average temperature sweep was approximately 41 K (73" F), whereas the adopted 
Apollo acceptance test  temperature sweep was 56 K (100" F). 
EXAMPLES OF OTHER PROGRAMS 
1- Qualification and acceptance t 
Syncom 
Qualification Qualification 
I 1 and acceptance 
I ATS 
1 I 
\ I 
Surveyor . 
L--!--- Qudification ccCanceI 
EXAMPLES OF EARLY APOLLO REQUIRLMENTS 
I I I I I I I I 1 I 1 
244 255 266 210 289 300 311 u2 333 344 355 
( -20) (0) (201 1401 (601 (801 1100) (120) 11401 1160) iimi 
Temperature. K ("FI 
Acceptance range Qualification temperature margin 
Figure B- 1. - Thermal acceptance and qualification temperature limits. 
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311 
11M)I 
The length of time that a compo- 
nent was maintained a t  the acceptance 
test  temperature extreme varied from 
30 minutes to 60 hours o r  to "sufficient 
f rom the Mariner program indicated 
3M) time to reach steady state. " Results (801 
that electronic equipment is much more 
susceptible to failure a t  high tempera- 
tures.  Therefore, a steady-state con- c 
- 
E 209 
Y 160) 
3 
e dition was maintained 8 to 12 times 
longer a t  the upper temperature limit 
than at the lower temperature limit. 
Approximately 90 to 95 percent of the 
days of qualification testing a t  the upper 
temperature limit. Therefore, for  
Mariner qualification testing, the com- 
for  12 days. 
m L
278 
140 
failures occurred during the f i r s t  12  266 
120 
255 
(01 ponent was maintained a t  348 K (167" F) 
- 
L 0,
e ._ e 
0 
L m c 
3 J
- 
Figure B-2. - Industrial practice for  
thermal acceptance testing. The vacuum chamber pressure 
was probably the most consistent value 
in the total thermal/thermal-vacuum 
test  requirements. Nearly all areas surveyed specified a value of 1 . 3 3 3  mN/m 
(1 x torr) o r  less (table B-I), but two programs specified 0.1333 mN/m 
(1 x torr). In all cases, the test  article was operating during the entire test, 
including chamber pumpdown. 
2 
2 
SYSTEM TEST I NG 
Complete integrated system tests generally consisted of placing the spacecraft in 
a vacuum chamber that had the capability of simulating the expected thermal-vacuum 
environment. The environment included a pressure of 1 .333  mN/m (1 X to r r )  o r  
less and a simulation of the external thermal environment. 
methods used for thermal simulation were to simulate the average environment sink 
temperature by means of zone panels along the chamber walls and to simulate the 
environment extremes by means of solar  simulators and liquid- nitrogen- cooled cham- 
ber walls. During spacecraft testing, the normal modes of operation were verified and 
component temperatures were monitored. 
2 
The two most common 
F o r  spacicraft qualification testing, self-induced heating and the worst- case 
combination of environmental extremes (maximum o r  minimum solar  constant, maxi- 
mum o r  minimum coating degradation, and maximum o r  minimum planet temperature 
and albedo) were used generally as the stimuli in the test. Component temperatures 
and system performance were monitored during these tests.  The temperatures of 
flight components were not allowed to exceed the qualification temperature limits. 
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TABLE B-I. - INDUSTRIAL SURVEY VACUUM LEVELS 
Program/vehicle 
Surveyor 
Syncom 
ATS 
OGO 
Pioneer 
Inteisat Ill 
Nimbus 
Biosatellite 
Lunar Orbiter 
b MSFC Agena payload 
ov- 1 
Mariner 
Vacuum, 
2 mN/m (torr) 
0 .1333  (1 x 
,1333 (1 x 
(4 
1 . 3 3 3  (1 x 
Test method 
Solar simulation 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
(a) 
X 
X 
(a) 
X 
aUnknown. 
bNASA George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. 
Nominal design environment and self-generated heat were used as the stimuli for 
acceptance testing. The test article performance and temperature were monitored 
while it was operated in all its modes. 
ThF duration of the spacecraft level testing varied from program to program. 
However, the two dominant approaches fo r  determining test  duration were calculated 
t ime to reach steady state (used when simulating the average space sink temperature 
levels) and the time equivalent to three orbits (used when simulating the solar spec- 
trum) to obtain the dynamic effects'of entering and exiting from the shadow of the 
planet. 
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SURVEY RESULTS 
The following specific conclusions were drawn from this survey. 
1. A margin of approximately 13 K (23" F) between the acceptance test  tempera- 
ture  levels and the qualification test temperature levels occurred. 
2. The average acceptance test  temperatures were from 273 to 314 K (32" to 
105" F), with the exceptions of the Mariner and Lunar Orbiter. 
2 3. Vacuum chamber pressure was 1.333 mN/m (1 x to r r )  o r  less. 
4. The equipment was operating during the test. The time at steady-state levels 
and the number of temperature cycles to which components were exposed varied widely 
among the programs. 
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APPENDIX C 
ACCEPTANCE TEST1 NG COMPONENT LI ST 
Component Part no. 
TAELE C-I. - VIBX4TICIN TESTS COMPONENT LIST 
(a) Command and service module (CSM) 
Increased CSM effectivity 
qualification 
101 103 104 106 and 
subsequent 
Master events ME901-0567-0019 
sequence controller 
jettison controller 
events controller 
separation sequence 
controller 
verification box 
Service module (SM) ME901-0569-0012 
Lunar docking ME476-0035-0001 
Lunar module (LM) ME450-0007-0001 
Pyro continuity V16- 540130- 201 
X 
X 
X 
iVater/glycol (w/G) flow- 
proportioning valve 
controller 
Heater controller 
W/G flow-proportioning 
valve 
Cabin temperature 
control 
Environmental control 
unit 
Cabin temperature 
controller 
Transducer 
Power supply valve 
x x  
x x  
x x  
x x  
x x  
x x  
x x  
ME476-0041-0001 
x x  
ME476- 0042- 0002 
ME284-0331-0001 
ME284-0335-0001 
ME901-0737 
830010-4 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X - 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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TABLE C-I. - Continued 
Component 
(a) Continued 
Part no. Inc re as ed CSM effectivity 
qualification 
101 103 104 106and 
subsequent 
Entry monitor system ME432-0129 
Flight director attitude 
Gyro assembly 
Translation controller 
Attitude-set control 
Rotation controller 
E le c tronic control 
assembly 
Reaction jet and engine 
on- off controls 
Gyro display coupler 
Gimbal-position and fuel- 
pressure indicator 
Thrust vector position 
se rvoamplif ier 
Electronic display 
assembly 
indicator (FDAI) 
panel 
X X 
ME 43 2- 01 68- 0 20 2 
ME493- 0010-0102 
ME901- 0702- 0002 
ME901-0703-0102 
ME901- 0704- 0002 
ME901- 0705- 0202 
ME901-0706-0102 
ME901-0707-0002 
ME432-0167-0102 
ME901-0708-0102 
ME901- 0710- 0202 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Automated control 
Instrumentation 
Instrumentation junction V36- 759522 X X 
Power control module V36-759525 and X X 
box 
3V36-759548 
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TABLE C-I. - Continued 
(a) Continued 
Component 
-~ 
Part no. 
Spacecraft junction box 
Displacement 
Very- high-f requency 
(VHF) transceiver 
vhf/amplitude modulation 
(AM) transmitter- 
receiver 
vhf recovery beacon 
Audio center equipment 
Premodulation processor 
vhf triplexer 
Central timing equipment 
V36- 759560 
3V36- 759031 
Up-data link equipment 
Pulse code modulation 
(PCM) telemetry 
equipment 
Signal conditioner 
S-band power amplifier 
Unified S- band equipment 
High- gain- antenna 
2-kMC antenna switch 
control unit 
High- gain- antenna 
High- gain antenna 
electronics assembly 
assembly 
In c r e as ed 
qualification 
Communications 
ME478- 0065- 0003 
ME478-0067-0005 
ME478-0069-0003 
ME473-0086-0003 
ME478- 0068- 0003 
ME 456- 0040- 0001 
ME456- 0041- 0030 
MC456-0041 
ME470-0101-0001 
MC490-0101 
ME901-0719-0004 
ME 901- 07 13- 001 3 
MC901-0713 
ME478- 0066- 0003 
ME478- 0070-0003 
ME450-0010-0003 
MC 48 1 - 0008 
ME452- 0052-0111 
MC 452- 005 
ME476-0039-0003 
ME481-0008-0003 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
CSM effectivity 
101 103 104 106 and 1 1 lsubsequent 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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TABLE C-I. - Continued 
(a) Continued 
Component Part no. Increased CSM effectivity 
qualification 
101 103 104 106 and 
subsequent 
Electrical power subsystem 
Power factor correction 
Direct- current power 
Main circuit breaker 
Uprighting box 
Battery circuit breaker 
Alternating- cur rent 
Fuel- cell shutoff 
Inverte r input mot o r  
switch assembly 
Fuel- cell remote control 
switch panel 
Power distribution box 
Inverter 
box 
control panel 
panel 
panel 
power control panel 
V36- 452000 
V36- 452020 
V36-452050 
V36-452170 
V36-452200 
V3 6- 4 54000 
V36-451240 
V3 6- 4 54050 
V37- 451200 
V37-451230 
ME49 5- 0001- 0006 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Electrical wiring 
SCS junction box 
Suit current limiter 
panel assembly 
V36-441209 
V36-443223 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X - 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X - 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Circuit utilization panel V36- 442213 X 
ass em bly 
assembly, reaction 
control system (RCS) 
Electrical control box V36-447545 
Component 
qualification 
101 
x x  Electrical control box 
assembly, service 
propulsion system (SPS) 
Electrical control box 
assembly, cryogenic 
system 
Cryogenic control panel 
assembly 
103 
X 
X 
Caution and warning 
(C&W) equipment 
430-0006 X x x x  
TABLE C-I. - Continued 
(a) Concluded 
X 
Part no. 
V37- 440030 
V37- 444010 
V37-445010 
Increased 1 CSM effectivity 
Displays and controls 
- 
104 
- 
X 
X 
X 
- 
106 and 
subsequent 
X 
X 
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TABLE C-I. - Continued 
(b) Lunar module 
Component 
-~ ~ 
Descent-engine ''D" 
junction box 
Ascent- engine bipropel- 
lant valve assembly 
Descent- stage propellant 
quantity gaging system 
(PQGS) unit 
Descent-stage PQGS 
sensors 
Solenoid- latching valve, 
descent and ascent 
stages 
Rough combustion cutoff 
assembly 
Propellant-level detector 
Solenoid- operated valve, 
descent and ascent 
stages 
Part no. 
I 
Increased LM effectivity 
qualification f  
subsequent 
Propulsion subsystem 
270- 00600 
270-00500 
270-00009 
270- 00009 
270-713 
270- 723 
270- 801 
270-00822 
X 
X 
X X 
Rate gyro assembly 
Descent-engine control 
Attitude and translation 
Attitude controller 
Abort electronics 
Abort sensor assembly 
assembly 
control assembly 
assembly 
assembly 
Stabilization and control subsystem 
300- 110 
300- 130 
300- 140 
300- 190 
300- 330 
300- 370 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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TABLE C-I. - Continued 
(b) Continued 
310-403 x x  
Component 
X 
Data entry and display 
Thrus t/translation 
Rendezvous radar 
Rendezvous radar  
Landing radar 
Landing radar antenna 
assembly 
controller assembly 
electronics ass em bly 
antenna assembly 
electronics assembly 
as s e m bl y 
320- 201 X X 
~ ~~~ 
Propellant solenoid 
valve 
X 
Par t  no. 
300-390 
300- 28800 
370- 100 
370- 200 
370-300 
370- 400 
Increased 1 LM effectivity 
Lunar surface probe 
assembly 
Environmental control subsystem 
Fan motor 
Transducer. 
Fan motor 
Coolant recirculation 
assembly (with 218 
switch) 
Cabin switch 
4 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
5 1 6 and 
subsequent 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Reaction control subsystem 
Mechanical design 
330-118 
330- 130 
330- 102 
330- 290 
I 330-323 
i ,  I' X X X X X 
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TABLE C-I. - Continued 
Component Part no. Inc re ased 
qualification 
(b) Continued 
LM effectivity 
2 3 4 5  6 and 
subsequent 
Tracking light 340- 0001 1 X x x x  
Utility light 340- 413 x x x  
Push- to-talk switch 
Helium temperature and 
pressure indicator 
Time-delay helium 
pressure equipment 
Attitude indicator 
Gimbal angle sequencing 
transformation 
assembly (GASTA) 
Cross- pointer meter 
Range/rate indicator 
CA1, CA2, and CA3 
stabilization control 
panels 
Digital event t imer 
Apollo mission clock 
RCS quantity indicator 
Dual vertical meter 
Toggle switches 
Rotary switches 
Flag indicator 
Component caution 
Pushbutton switches 
' indicator 
X 
X 
350-90 
350- 201 
3 50- 202 
350- 301 
350-302 
350-305 
350-307 
350-308 
3 50- 3 10 
350-312 
350- 401 
350-801 
3 5 0 - 8 ~  
3 50- 803 
3 50- 804 
350-806 
3 50- 808 
~~ 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Cuiiiponeni: Increased 
qualification 
X C&W indicators 
Synchro transmitter 
LM effectivity 
2 3 4 5  6 and 
subsequent 
X X 
X X 
PCM and timing 
Signal- conditioner 
C&W electronics 
Data storage electronics 
electronics assembly 
electronic assembly 
assembly 
assembly 
x x  
x x  
TABLE C-I. - Continued 
X 
X 
(b) Continued 
380-00060 
380- 001 30 
380-00170 X 
380-00250 
380- 00290 
380- 00330 X 
Part no. 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
350-809 
350- 60600 
General- purpose 390- 6 X 
Lighting control 390-9 
Lightweight relay 390- 23 
inverter 
subassembly 
junction box 
x x  
X 
X 
Instrumentation 
360- 2 
360- 5 
360-8 
360- 12 
Propulsion quantity 
measuring device 
X 
X 
X 
Digital uplink assembly 
S-band transceiver 
Signal processor  
vhf transceiver and 
S-band power amplifier 
S-band steerable antenna 
assembly 
diplexer 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
F- 
I 
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TABLE C-I. - Continued 
(b) Continued 
Component 
Deadface relay 
Ascent- stage electrical 
control assembly 
Descent-stage ECA 
Power sensor fuse 
assembly 
Panel I11 module 
assembly 
Panel VI11 module 
assembly 
Panel XI1 module 
assembly 
ECS relay box 
Ascent-engine arming 
assembly 
Panel I1 module 
assembly 
Utility light switch 
assembly 
Rough combustion cutoff 
relay assembly 
Fuse assembly no. 1 
Descent-engine prevalve 
diode assembly 
Panel I module assembly 
Explosive device relay 
Auxiliary switch relay 
(ECN 
box 
assembly 
42 
Part no. 
390- 24 
390- 25 
390- 26 
390- 21055 
390-28125 
390- 28115 
390- 51025 
390- 281 51 
390- 28155 
390- 51026 
390- 52058 
390- 5219 5 
390- 53057 
390- 53082 
390-53122 
390- 53152 
390- 531 54 
Increased 
palif ication 
X 
X 
X 
- 
2 
X 
X 
- 
- 
3 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
LM effectivity - 
4 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
5 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
6 and 
iubsequent 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
TABLE C-I. - Concluded 
(b) Concluded 
qualification 
Component 
3 4 5  
x x x  
x x x  
x x x  
x x x  
6 and 
subsequenl 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Power failure relay 
ass e mbly 
Attitude and translation 
control assembly 
output load resistor 
Ascent-stage batteries 
Descent- stage batteries 
390- 53155 I I x  
390-53165 X 
390-21000 
390- 22000 
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